Opening this page does not mean your account is compromised. Take a minute to look at what gave the email away, so the next real one is easier to spot.
Look closely at the sender domain
The email came from security@hugingface.co. The real domain has a double g immediately after hu:
hugingface.co
Realhuggingface.co
A single missing or swapped character is easy to miss, especially on a phone or when the message looks routine. Check the full sender address and the address of any page before you sign in.
Do not sign in from links in unexpected emails
- Reach Okta and other internal tools through a bookmark you saved yourself or the official dashboard you already use, not through a link in an email.
- If a message asks you to change a security setting, open the dashboard yourself and look for the setting there.
- Be careful with messages that sound urgent or ask for an action on your account, even when the branding looks right.
Use phishing-resistant MFA
Phishing-resistant methods are tied to the real website, so they do not work on a lookalike page even if you are fooled by it:
- Passkeys
- FIDO2 security keys
- Okta FastPass, on devices and sign-in flows where it is supported and configured to resist phishing
Push notifications, one-time codes and SMS codes are better than a password alone, but a fake sign-in page can relay them. Having an authenticator app installed does not by itself make your sign-in phishing-resistant.
Report suspicious messages
If you receive a message that looks suspicious, report it to the Security team through the channel you already know. Do not use links, phone numbers or reply addresses provided in the suspicious message itself. Reporting early helps even if you already clicked.